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Can We Be Epigenetically Proactive?
Kathinka Evers
The human brain is an essentially evaluative organ endowed with reward systems
engaged in learning and memory as well as in higher evaluative tendencies. Our
innate species-specific, neuronally-based identity disposes us to develop universal
evaluative tendencies, such as self-interest, control-orientation, dissociation, se-
lective sympathy, empathy, and xenophobia. The combination of these tendencies
may place us in a predicament. Our neuronal identity makes us social, but also
individualistic and self-projective, with an emotional and intellectual engagement
that is far more narrowly focused in space and time than the effects of our actions.
However, synaptic epigenesis theories of cultural and social  imprinting on our
brain  architecture  suggest  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  culturally  influencing
these predispositions. In an analysis of epigenesis by selective stabilisation of
synapses, I discuss the relationships between genotype and brain phenotype: the
paradox of non-linear evolution between genome and brain complexity; the selec-
tion of cultural circuits in the brain during development; and the genesis and epi-
genetic transmission of cultural imprints. I proceed to discuss the combinatorial
explosion of brain representations, and the channelling of behaviour through “epi-
genetic rules” and top-down control of decision-making. In neurobiological terms,
these “rules” are viewed as acquired patterns of connections (scaffoldings), hypo-
thetically stored in frontal cortex long-term memory, which frame the genesis of
novel  representations  and  regulate  decision-making  in  a top-down  manner.
Against that background I propose the possibility of being epigenetically proact-
ive, and adapting our social structures, in both the short and the long term, to be-
nefit, influence, and constructively interact with the ever-developing neuronal ar-
chitecture of our brains.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary neuroscience no longer views the
brain as an input-output processing device but
as an autonomously active, self-referential, and
selectional  system  operating  in  a  projective
style, which is in constant social interaction and
in which values  are incorporated as  necessary
constraints. The idea that evolution by natural
selection has given rise to an essentially evaluat-
ive  cerebral  architecture  raises  the  question
whether, in the human species, such neurobiolo-
gically-based  predispositions  have  further  de-
veloped  the  means  to  generate  novel  specific
values on higher cognitive levels. The concept of
“value” would then play a central role as some-
thing  that  is  taken  into  account  in  decision-
making and that influences a choice, selection,
or  decision,  that  can  occur  on  many levels—
non-conscious as well as conscious—as a basic
biological function or as a feature of advanced
moral reasoning. But, if we are born evaluators,
to what extent can these predispositions with
which we are all born be culturally controlled?
In this article,  I  suggest that our innate
species-specific neurally based identity disposes
us  to  develop  universal  evaluative  tendencies,
such as self-interest, control-orientation, dissoci-
ation,  selective sympathy,  empathy, and xeno-
phobia.  The  combination  of  these  tendencies
may place us in a practical and moral predica-
ment. Our neuronal identity as persons makes
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us social, but also individualistic and self-pro-
jective, with an emotional and intellectual en-
gagement that is far more narrowly focused in
space and time than the effects of our actions. 
However, the neuronal organisation of our
adult brain develops in the course of a fifteen
year-long period following birth, during which,
and, to a lesser extent, after which it is subject
to  cultural  influence,  both  on  the  individual
level and, at the social group level, across gener-
ations  (Lagercrantz 2005;  Lagercrantz et  al.
2010; Collin & van den Heuvel 2013). Synaptic
epigenesis  theories  of  cultural  and  social  im-
printing on our brain architecture (which differ
from less discriminative epigenetic modifications
of  nuclear  chromatin)  (Changeux 1985;
Kitayama &  Uskul 2011) suggest that there is
an interesting possibility, which, in my opinion,
has hitherto been underestimated. That is, we
could  potentially  be  epigenetically  proactive
(Evers 2009) and adapt our social structures, in
both the short and the long term, to benefit, in-
fluence,  and  constructively  interact  with  the
ever-developing  neuronal  architecture  of  our
brains.
2 The social individualist
2.1 An egocentric evaluator
The human brain is intrinsically active: it pro-
duces electrical and chemical activity both in re-
sponse to external stimuli and, spontaneously, in-
dependently of them. The brain is an autonom-
ously-active motivated neuronal system, genetic-
ally equipped with a predisposition to explore the
world  and  to  classify  what  it  finds  there
(Changeux 1985,  2004).  On-going  spontaneous
activity is present throughout the nervous system.
In the embryo, spontaneous movements (Naray-
anan & Hamburger 1971) and waves of endogen-
ous retinal activity (Galli & Maffei 1988;  Good-
man & Shatz 1993) are thought to play an im-
portant role in the epigenesis of neural networks
through synapse selection (see below). On-going
spontaneous activity is also present in the adult
brain, where it is responsible for the highly vari-
able patterns of the electroencephalogram(EEG;
Berger 1929;  Raichle et al. 2001). Thalamocor-
tical networks generate a variety of oscillations,
whose rhythms change across the sleep-wake cycle
(Llinas &  Paré 1991). Optical imaging methods
in anesthetized animals also reveal fast spontan-
eous states of neuronal activity that, far from be-
ing random, exhibit patterns that resemble those
evoked by external stimuli. In parallel, functional
neuroimaging studies  in  humans have  shown a
globally-elevated brain metabolism at rest, with
localized patterns suggesting that particular cor-
tical regions are maintained in a high, although
variable, state of activity referred to as “default
mode” by Raichle et al. (2001).
Hypotheses of knowledge acquisition posit
that patterns of  spontaneous activity,  referred
to as “pre-representations”,  arise  in  the brain
and are selected by reward signals as “repres-
entations”  confirmed by both  external  experi-
ence and internal processes of evaluation within
a  conscious  neuronal  workspace  (Dehaene &
Changeux 2011).  Such  “models  of  the  world”
are  stabilised  through  “cognitive  games”  by
analogy with Wittgenstein “language games”, as
permanent features of the developing cognitive
apparatus, according to a process referred to as
“mental Darwinism” (Changeux 2004).
Anticipation of reward signals introduces a
delay between the elaboration of tacit plans of
action  and  actual  interaction  with  the  world
performed by the organism, which presupposes
a  distinction  of  temporal  states:  awareness  of
the present, remembrance of the past, and anti-
cipation of  the  future  (Barto &  Sutton 1982;
Schultz et al. 1997; Dehaene & Changeux 2000;
Schultz 2006). Without any capacity to evaluate
stimuli,  the  brain  could  neither  learn  nor  re-
member: it has to prefer some stimuli to others
in order to learn. This classical idea in learning
theory has been expressed in neuronal terms by
Dehaene & Changeux (1991), and by Edelman
in his accounts of primary consciousness (Edel-
man 1992).  In  these  accounts,  learning  is  a
change in actual behaviour, or the storage of a
trace subsequently unveiled (Dudai 1989, 2002)
through brain categorizations of stimuli. These
are given in terms of positive or negative values,
understood as something that is taken into ac-
count in decision-making and that influences a
choice, selection or decision, which can occur on
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many levels. Through its intense and spontan-
eous activity, the brain has also been described
as a narrative organ, spinning its own neuronal
tale  (Evers 2009).  The  narrations  will  vary
greatly  between  individuals,  but  each  will  be
self-projective.
The natural egocentricity or individualism
of the human brain appears quite pronounced.
In its projection of autonomously-produced im-
ages,  the brain refers all  experiences to itself,
that is, to its own individual perspective. This
self-projection is a biological predisposition that
humans possess innately and that is closely con-
nected to our predisposition for developing self-
awareness, which Edelman suggests is a neces-
sary condition for developing higher-order con-
sciousness  (Edelman 1992;  Denton 2006;  see
also Tulving 1983). The existence of a self-pro-
jecting systems monitoring internal processes in
the brain was suggested by an early Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) study of self-gen-
erated actions showing hemodynamic activity in
the posterior cingulate cortex (Blakemore et al.
1998). This observation was confirmed and ex-
tended  by  magneto-encephalography  following
synchronization  in  the  gamma  range  (55–100
Hz), thus defining a major network of the brain:
the paralimbic interaction between the medial
prefrontal/anterior  cingulate  and  medial  pari-
etal/posterior cingulate cortices and subcortical
regions (Lou et al. 2004; rev. Changeux & Lou
2011).  Damasio (1999)  distinguished  a  “core
consciousness”  (core  self)  from  an  “extended
consciousness” (extended self) that we consider
as analogous to the “minimal self” and “exten-
ded  self”  of  Gallagher (2000).  Minimal  self-
awareness  is  prereflexive,  immediate  and  nor-
mally  reliable,  while  still  involving  a sense  of
ownership of experience (Gallagher 2000). The
“extended self” is a coherent self that persists
across time and requires a system that can re-
trieve  long-term memories  of  personal  experi-
ences—namely,  episodic  memory  (Gardiner
2001). Consequently, episodic memory retrieval
becomes  an  indispensable  component  of  the
more complex forms of self-awareness and con-
sciousness (Tulving 1983). 
In the course of growing up, the infant de-
velops  the  capacity  to  focus  its  attention;  it
learns to distinguish between and recognise ob-
jects in its environment, such as faces, and be-
comes aware of itself as standing in various rela-
tions to these objects. Conscious processing de-
velops into auto-distinction (when “this-here” is
distinguished from “that-there”). When further
developed, the individual becomes aware of it-
self as a subject of experience and ascribes men-
tal states to itself: auto-distinction evolves into
self-awareness  (when  “this-here”  becomes  “I”)
usually at around one and a half years of age
(Lagercrantz 2005),  and  possibly  even  earlier
(Falck-Ytter et al. 2006; see also Rochat 2001).
From the age of six to twelve months, the child
typically sees a “sociable playmate” in the mir-
ror’s  reflection.  Self-admiring  and  embarrass-
ment  usually  begin  at  twelve  months,  and at
fourteen  to  twenty  months  most  children
demonstrate  avoidance  behaviours.  Finally,  at
eighteen months 50% of children recognize the
reflection  in  the  mirror  as  their  own  and  by
twenty to twenty-four months this rises to 65%
—this is revealed, for instance, by them trying
to evince marks on their own nose, taking ad-
vantage, in all these instances, of their episodic
memory abilities (see Tulving 1983).
An evolved survival function that adds an
evaluative element to our brain’s self-projective
mode of operation is self-interest, expressed as a
desire to survive, to be well-fed, safe, to repro-
duce, and so on. This is not a defining charac-
teristic,  for  there  are  exceptions,  for  example
subjects who have a very poorly developed self-
interest  (Damasio 1994;  Damasio &  Carvalho
2013). Nor is it necessarily rational, since biolo-
gical  evolution  is  circumstantial.  There  is  an
abundant literature on the phenomenologically
rich concept of  self-interest  in philosophy and
ethics, in terms e.g., of enlightenment, egoism,
capacity for altruism, etc. Such issues are relev-
ant and interesting but beyond the scope of this
discussion. In the present context, self-interest is
understood  in  a  minimalistic  sense,  as  an
evolved survival function that adds an evaluat-
ive element to our brain’s self-projective mode
of operation.
Self-interest is also a source of the urge to
control the immediate environment, and of the
need for familiarity, security, and preference for
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the known. The subjective experience of some
level  of  control  and  the  security  that  this
provides is in fact a necessary condition for the
individual to develop in a healthy manner and
to consolidate an integrated sense of  self  (Le-
doux 1998).  When the  external  circumstances
become severely disturbing, we feel increasingly
threatened and have a defence mechanism that
is eventually activated: dissociation, here under-
stood as a process whereby information—incom-
ing, stored, or outgoing—is actively prevented
from integration with its usual or expected as-
sociations.
The human being is, in this sense, a “dis-
sociative  animal”:  we  spend  a  considerable
amount of intellectual and emotional energy on
distancing ourselves from a wide range of things
that we consciously or non-consciously fear or
dislike (Evers 2009). When an experience is too
painful to accept, we sometimes deliberately do
not accept it; instead of integrating it into our
ordinary  system  of  associations,  we  push  it
away from us, and prevent it from being integ-
rated into our consciousness. Pushed to an ex-
treme, this tendency may become pathological,
e.g., in the development of Dissociative Identity
Disorder  (cf.  DSM-IV), but as  a non-patholo-
gical process it is an important adaptive func-
tion, and a valuable evolutionary asset allowing
us to survive events that we would otherwise be
unable to endure (Putnam 1989; Evers 2001).
So far, I have described the brain as an
autonomously active, self-projective, and selec-
tional  neural  system  with  innate  evaluative
tendencies, e.g., self-interest, control-orientation,
and dissociation. These cerebral features charac-
terize the individual, but they are also reflected
in the social relationships proper to the human
species.
2.2 Selective sympathy & empathetic 
xenophobia
In social animals, self-interest is a source of in-
terest in others. In the case of humans, this so-
cial interest focuses primarily on those to whom
the self can relate and with whom it identifies,
such  as  the  next  of  kin,  the  clan,  the  com-
munity,  etc.  The human brain conjugates  op-
posite tendencies: first, embodied in the human
subject,  it  is  engaged in highly individualistic
and self-projective actions,  such as the search
for water or food. But it also mediates co-oper-
ative social relationships: the “I” is extended to
endorse the group, as a “we”, and distinctions
are drawn between “us” and “them” (Ricoeur
1992;  Changeux &  Ricoeur 2000).  Sympathy
and aid is typically extended to others in pro-
portion to their closeness to us in terms of bio-
logy, e.g., face recognition (Michel et al. 2006;
Hills & Lewis 2006), racial out-group versus in-
group distinctions (Hart et al. 2000;  Phelps et
al. 2003), culture, ideology, etc.
Imagining an action or actually perform-
ing that action both have similar neural circuits
(which  include  the  premotor  cortex,  supple-
mentary motor  area,  cerebellum,  parietal  cor-
tex, and basal ganglia) to those activated when
one observes, imitates, or imagines actions per-
formed by other  individuals  (Jeannerod 2006;
Decety 2012). The model mechanism suggested
is that actions are coded in terms of perceivable
effects  (Hommel et  al. 2001).  Performing  a
movement leaves a memory of  the association
between the motor pattern by which it was gen-
erated and the sensory effects that it produces.
Such stored associations can then be used to re-
trieve  a  movement  by  anticipating  its  effects.
This  perception-action  coupling  mechanism,
which includes active sensing and motor-sensory
loops (Gordon &  Ahissar 2012) and to which
may  be  added  the  motor  theory  of  language
(Liberman & Mattingly 1985), offers a mechan-
ism for intersubjective communication and so-
cial understanding by creating functional links
between first-person and third-person informa-
tion  (Decety &  Sommerville 2003;  Jackson &
Decety 2004).
Functional  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging
and  magneto-encephalography  among  other
methods  have  led  to  the  demonstration  that
when children or adults watch other subjects in
pain, the neural circuits mobilized by the pro-
cessing of first-hand experience of pain are ac-
tivated  in  the  observer  (Singer et  al. 2004;
Cheng et al. 2008). This sharing allows mapping
of the perceived affective cues of others onto the
behaviours and experiences of the self-oriented
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response. Decety (2012) argues that, depending
on the extent of the overlap in the pain matrix,
and complex interactions with personal disposi-
tions,  motivation,  contextual  information,  and
self-regulation, this can lead to personal distress
(i.e.,  self-centred  motivation)  or  to  empathic
concern (i.e., an other-oriented response). This
basic  somatic  sensorimotor  resonance  plays  a
critical  role  in  the recognition and sharing of
others’ affective states.
There  is  an  important  neural  distinction
between apprehending and caring that makes it
possible to understand the affective state of an-
other without feeling engaged in it. Studies in
the neurobiology of empathy (here understood
as the ability to apprehend the mental states of
others),  and  sympathy  (the  ability  to  care
about others) suggest that these abilities involve
complex  cognitive  functions  with  large  indi-
vidual and contextual variations that depend on
both biological and socio-cultural factors (Jack-
son & Decety 2004; Singer et al. 2004; Singer et
al. 2006;  Iacoboni et  al. 2005;  Jackson et  al.
2006; Lawrence et al. 2006; Parr & Waller 2006;
Engen & Singer 2013). Such results are import-
ant, because appreciating the brain’s role in ap-
prehending  and  responding  to  the  affective
states of others can help us understand people
who exhibit  social  cognitive disorders and are
deficient in experiencing socially relevant emo-
tions such as sympathy, shame, or guilt. 
However,  even in supposedly healthy hu-
man brains the capacity for other-oriented re-
sponses, such as sympathy, is pronouncedly se-
lective  and  limited  by  spontaneous  aggressive
tendencies (Panksepp 1998; Lorenz 1963). When
sympathy and mutual aid is extended within a
group, they are also (de facto) withheld from
those that do not belong to this group. In other
words, interest in others is ordinarily expressed
positively or negatively towards specific groups
—but very rarely are attitudes extended to uni-
versal  coverage,  for  example  as  attitudes  to-
wards the entire human species, or towards all
sentient beings. 
Understanding does not entail compassion,
but is frequently combined with emotional dis-
sociation from “the other”. We can easily under-
stand,  say,  that  a  child  in  a  distant  country
probably reacts to hunger or pain in a way that
is similar to how children in our own country
react to hunger or pain, but that does not mean
that we care about those children in equal or
even  comparable  measures.  Indeed,  if  under-
standing entailed sympathy, the world would be
a far more pleasant dwelling place for many of
its inhabitants. By nature, we are “empathetic
xenophobes”  (Evers 2009):  we are  empathetic
by virtue of our intelligence and capacity to ap-
prehend  the  mental  life  of  a  relatively  wide
range of creatures, but far more sympathetic to
the closer group into which are born or choose
to  join,  remaining  neutral  or  hostile  to  “out-
group” individuals.1
Thus, in spite of our natural capacity for
empathy, sympathy, and mutual assistance, the
human being can also be described as a self-in-
terested,  control-oriented,  dissociative  xeno-
phobe. In view of their historic prevalence, it is
not unlikely that these features have evolved to
become  a  part  of  our  innate  neurobiological
identity and that any attempt to construe social
structures  (rules,  conventions,  contracts,  etc.)
opposing this identity must, in order to be real-
istically implemented, take this biological chal-
lenge into account in addition to the historically
well-known political,  social,  and cultural  chal-
lenges. 
A major practical problem is that the ef-
fects of our actions are not limited, as are our
capacities for engagement. The difficulty of wide
involvement  due  to  the  brain’s  self-projective
egocentricity is matched by a capacity to cause
large-scale effects, which poses serious problems
whenever large-scale or long-term solutions are
needed—say,  to  improve  the  global  environ-
ment, reduce global poverty, or safeguard future
generations. Our societies are importantly con-
strued  around  egocentric  and  short-term per-
spectives—political, economical, etc.—making it
extremely  difficult  to  put  global  or  long-term
thought and foresight into practice. This is of
course  only  to  be  expected,  since  our  brains’
1 I am here discussing social attitudes in terms of subjective evaluat-
ors, but they can also be discussed in terms of non-conscious non-
feeling units. Some current neuroscience literature may prefer to dis-
cuss the issue not from the point of view of subjective definitions but
rather  from the perspective  of  relevance  detection and evaluation
that is objectively observed.
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neuronal architectures are engaged in social in-
teractions  and determine  the social  structures
that we can and do develop.
However,  our  brain  identity  incorporates
social influence. Culture and nature stand in a
relationship of  mutual  causal  influence:  whilst
the organisation of our brains in part determ-
ines who we are and what types of societies we
develop, our social structures also have a strong
impact  on  the  brain’s  organisation;  notably,
they impact upon cultural imprints epigenetic-
ally stored in  our brains.  The genetic  control
over the brain’s development is subject to epi-
genetic evolutionary processes; that is to say, to
a coordinated and organised neuronal develop-
ment that is the result of learning and experi-
ence and that is intermixed with the action of
genes. The door to being epigenetically proact-
ive is, accordingly, opened. In the following ana-
lysis  of  epigenesis  by selective  stabilisation  of
synapses I shall discuss the relationship between
genotype and brain phenotype; the paradox of
non-linear evolution between genome and brain
complexity; the selection of cultural circuits in
the brain during development; and the genesis
and epigenetic transmission of cultural imprints.
3 Neuronal epigenesis
3.1 Genotype & brain phenotype: The 
paradox of non-linear 
evolution between genome & brain 
complexity
The  comparison  between  what  we  presently
know  about  human  genomes  and  the  brain
phenotype raises  the  paradox  of  a  non-linear
evolution between the complexity of the genome
and that of the brain (Changeux 1985, 2012b).
From a molecular  neurobiologist’s  perspective,
the cognitive abilities and skills required for the
highest functions of the human brain are built
from a cascade of events driven by a “genetic
envelope”, which makes the difference between
Homo sapiens and the human family’s earliest
ancestors, but which cannot be simply related
to genome size, nor to the number of genes. 
The total amount of DNA housed in the
haploid  genome  is  approximately  3.1  billion
base  pairs,  but  no  more  than  20,000–25,000
gene sequences (1.2% of  our genome code for
exons—the  DNA  components  of  genes),  and
this  number does  not  significantly  differ  from
mouse  to  human.  Moreover,  the  difference  in
full  DNA sequences are very limited:  between
humans  and  chimpanzees  they  comprise  no
more  than  4%  of  the  genome.  However,  the
total number of neurons in the human brain is
in the order of 85 billion, compared to about 70
million in the brain of the mouse (Azevedo et
al. 2009). Yet, notwithstanding the increase in
cell  numbers,  with  each neuron possessing  its
particular connectivity and its set of genes ex-
pressed, mammalian brain anatomy has evolved
dramatically from a poorly corticalized lissen-
cephalic brain with about 10–20 identified cor-
tical areas to a brain with a very high relative
cortical  surface,  multiple  gyri  and  sulci,  and
possibly as many as 100 identified cortical areas
(Mountcastle 1998).  Thus,  there  exists  a  re-
markable  nonlinear  relationship  between  the
evolution of brain anatomy and the evolution of
the genome organisation. 
Molecular  and cellular  explanations  have
been suggested to account for this nonlinear re-
lationship. One is the combinatorial expression
of spatio-temporal patterns of genes that affect
development  (Changeux 1985;  Edelman 1987;
Tsigelny et al. 2013). Another, non-exclusive ex-
planation,  is  the  contribution  of  “epigenetic
mechanisms” driven by interaction with the en-
vironment in the course of the long postnatal
period of  brain maturation—circa 15 years  in
humans—during  which  critical  and  reciprocal
relationships take place between the brain and
its physical, social, and cultural environment. It
is on these epigenetic mechanisms that I shall
focus here.
3.2 The epigenesis of neuronal networks 
by selective stabilization of synapses
The word “epigenesis”  can  be  traced  back to
William Harvey (1651), who stated in contrast
to contemporary preformationist views that the
embryo arises by “the addition of parts budding
out from one another”. It was subsequently used
by Conrad Waddington (1942) to specify the re-
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lationship between the genes and their environ-
ment to produce a phenotype. This is also the
meaning adopted in the theory of the epigenesis
of  neuronal networks by selective stabilization
of synapses, according to which the environment
affects  the  organisation  of  connections  in  an
evolving neuronal network through the stabiliz-
ation  or  elimination  (pruning)  of  labile  syn-
apses, under the control of the state of activity
of  the  network  (Changeux et  al. 1973).  This
meaning, which I shall use henceforth, contrasts
with the more recent and biochemically distinct
meaning of the word epigenetic, which refers to
the  status  of  DNA  methylation  and  histone
modification  in  a  particular  genomic  region.
This concerns the neuronal nucleus, but not the
diversity  of  individual  synaptic  contacts  (Sas-
sone-Corsi &  Christen 2012).  The modulatory
role  of  chromatin  modifications  in  long-term
memory  has  already  been  described  (see  e.g.,
Levenson & Sweatt 2005), but the informational
content involved—which relies upon cell bodies
—is  expected  to  be  in  orders  of  magnitude
smaller that of synaptic epigenesis, based upon
the combinatorial power of individual synapses.
During embryonic and postnatal develop-
ment,  the  million  billion  (1015)  synapses  that
form the human brain network do not assemble
like the parts of a computer, that is, according
to a plan that precisely defines the disposition
of  all  the individual  components.  If  this  were
the case, the slightest error in the instructions
for carrying out this program could have cata-
strophic  consequences.  On  the  contrary,  the
mechanism appears  to rely on the progressive
setting  of  robust  interneuronal  connections
through trial-and-error mechanisms that form-
ally resemble an evolutionary process by vari-
ation selection (Changeux et al. 1973; Changeux
&  Danchin 1976;  Edelman 1987;  Changeux
2012a).  At sensitive  periods of  brain develop-
ment,  the  phenotypic  variability  of  nerve  cell
distribution and position, as well as the exuber-
ant spreading and the multiple figures of transi-
ently-formed  connections  originating  from the
erratic wandering of growth cone behaviour, in-
troduce a maximal diversity of synaptic connec-
tions. This variability is then reduced by the se-
lective stabilization of some of  the labile con-
tacts and the elimination (or retraction) of oth-
ers. The crucial hypothesis of the model is that
the  evolution  of  the  connective  state  of  each
synaptic  contact  is  governed  globally,  and
within  a  given  time  window,  by  the  overall
“message” of signals experienced by the cell on
which it terminates (Changeux et al. 1973). 
One consequence of this is that particular
electrical and chemical spatiotemporal patterns
of activity in developing neuronal networks are
liable to be inscribed under the form of defined
and stable topologies of connections within the
frame of the genetic envelope. In humans, about
half  of  all  adult  connections  are  formed after
birth at a very fast rate. The nesting of these
multiple traces directly contributes to forming
and shaping the micro- and macroscopic archi-
tecture of the wiring network of the adult hu-
man brain, thus bringing an additional explana-
tion to the above-mentioned non-linearity para-
dox. 
Another consequence of the synapse-selec-
tion model (originally presented as a “theorem
of variability”) is that the selection of networks
with different connective topologies can lead to
the same input-output behavioural relationship
(Changeux et  al. 1973).  This  accounts for  an
important feature of the human brain: the con-
stancy or “invariance” of defined states of beha-
viour,  despite  the  epigenetic  “variability”
between individual brains’ connectivity.
Finally,  both  the  spontaneous  and  the
evoked activity may contribute to synapse selec-
tion. In this framework, a suggestion has been
made that reward signals received from the en-
vironment may control the developmental evolu-
tion of connectivity (Gisiger et al. 2005; Gisiger
&  Kerszberg 2006).  In other  words,  reinforce-
ment learning would modulate the epigenesis of
the network. The model has been implemented
in a case of  the learning of  a  visual  delayed-
matching-to-sample task (see below). This pro-
cess of synaptic selection by reward signals may
concern the evolution of  brain connectivity in
single individuals, but it also concerns the ex-
change of information and shared emotions or
rewards between individuals in the social group
(Changeux 1985, 2004; Gisiger et al. 2005). This
is an important part of our argument; it may
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thus play a critical role in social and cultural
evolution. 
3.3 The selection of cultural circuits in 
the brain during development & the 
epigenetic transmission of cultural 
imprints
There is an abundance of experimental studies
that  are  consistent  with,  or  directly  support,
the model of synapse selection. In humans the
maximum  synaptic  density  is  reached  within
three years, then steadily declines until the total
number stabilises  around the time of  puberty
(Huttenlocher et  al. 1997;  Bourgeois 1997;
Petanjek et al. 2011). Yet the process of syn-
aptic refinement goes far beyond puberty: learn-
ing is life-long (Petanjek et al. 2011). The ob-
served global decline in synaptic numbers dur-
ing childhood plausibly reflects a rich cascade of
elementary steps of  learning by selection. Nu-
merous studies have shown that when neuronal
activity  is  experimentally  modified,  synaptic
elimination is altered (Benoit & Changeux 1975,
1978; Stretavan et al. 1988; Purves & Lichtman
1980;  Luo &  O’Leary 2005;  Innocenti &  Price
2005;  Collin &  van den Heuvel 2013). At vari-
ance with the classical Lamarckist-constructivist
scheme  (Quartz &  Sejnowski 1997),  blocking
the activity maintains a high number of connec-
tions: it is activity that enhances synaptic elim-
ination  (Benoit &  Changeux 1975,  1978;
Stretavan et  al. 1988;  Luo &  O’Leary 2005).
Thus  “to  learn  is  to  eliminate”  (Changeux
1985). 
Among  the  cortical  connections  estab-
lished in post-natal life are the long-range tracts
between the frontal areas (Miller & Cohen 2001;
Fuster 2008) and other brain cortical areas (in-
cluding  sensory  ones)  (Goldman-Rakic 1987;
Goldman-Rakic 1999;  Hagmann et  al. 2008;
Collin & van den Heuvel 2013). Some years ago,
it was suggested, according to the “global neur-
onal  workspace”  hypothesis,  that  these  long-
range  connections,  by  broadcasting  signals  to
multiple  brain  areas,  yield  subjective  “con-
scious” experience by allowing sensory inputs—
seeing,  hearing  and  so  on—global  access  to
many brain areas (Dehaene et al. 1998; Dehaene
& Changeux 2011). The long-range connections
would provide a structural basis for the global
experience known as conscious access. 
These long-range connections are particu-
larly  important  in  the  case  of  the  prefrontal
areas  which  contribute  to  planning,  decision-
making,  thought,  and socialisation.  The onto-
geny and postnatal development of  long-range
connectivity expectedly reveal phases of exuber-
ance and phases of selection and axonal pruning
(Collin & van den Heuvel 2013). In human new-
borns evolution is slow, and it has been sugges-
ted that the phase of exuberant long axon re-
moval  is  largely completed at  the age of  two
years,  accompanied  by  increasing  information
processing and cognitive development (Collin &
van den Heuvel 2013). Evolution continues dur-
ing adolescence until adulthood with decreasing
segregation  and  increasing  integration,  mainly
but  not  exclusively  driven  by  modulation  of
connections strength (local synaptic elimination
persists in the adult; Petanjek et al. 2011). It is
expected  to  have  major  consequences  on  the
laying down of cultural imprints including the
“epigenetic rules” associated with socialisation.
The  acquisition  of  reading  and  writing
may be viewed as a typical example of epigen-
etic development of “cultural circuits”. Writing
and  reading  are  recent  cultural  inventions
(about 5000 years old) that evolved into distinct
sub-systems and put considerable demands on
our cognitive system. Historically, the first evid-
ence for specialized writing and reading circuits
in the brain was the discovery by the French
neurologist  Dejerine (1895) of pure alexia, also
known as alexia without agraphia. Individuals
with  pure  alexia  suffer  from  severe  reading
problems  while  other  language-related  skills
such as naming, oral repetition, auditory com-
prehension  or  writing  are  typically  intact.
Alexia results from cerebral lesions in circum-
scribed brain regions including the angular and
supramarginal gyri. New specialized sets of con-
nections  are  present  exclusively  in  individuals
that  have  learned  written  language  and  have
been selected and consolidated in the course of
development at sensitive periods (4–6 years) as
a consequence of an intensive period of educa-
tion.
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The human brain did not evolve to learn
to read, but possesses enough epigenetic variab-
ility in the course of its development (and also
—though to a lesser extent—in the adult) to in-
corporate a cultural invention of this kind. Dur-
ing  the  acquisition  of  reading and writing  by
Western  subjects,  representations  for  visual
forms of words progressively settle into the oc-
cipito-temporal  cortex,  recruiting  a  subset  of
functionally-appropriate  object  recognition  re-
gions in the temporo-parietal junction (Dehaene
et al. 2010). The group of illiterate individuals
is consistently more right-lateralized than their
literate controls (Petersson et al. 2007). Inter-
estingly, alphabetic writing systems recruit cir-
cuits that differ in part from those mobilized by
the  Chinese  ideographic  systems.  In  French
readers  reading  French,  activations  were  en-
hanced in left-hemisphere visual area V1, with
the strongest differences between French words
and their controls found at the central and hori-
zontal  meridian  representations.  In  contrast,
Chinese  readers  reading  Chinese  showed  en-
hanced activations in intermediate visual areas
V3v/hV4,  which  was  absent  in  French  parti-
cipants (Szwed et al. 2014). Also, the capacity
to read sheet music is selectively altered in mu-
sic-specific  forms  of  alexia.  Neuronal  circuits
specific to a given culture may thus become epi-
genetically  established  in  the  brains  of  social
group  members.  Written  language-learning  is
only one of the many cultural imprints acquired
during  the  development  of  the  human  brain
(Changeux 1985).  For  instance,  cross-cultural
differences  between  Asian  and  Western  parti-
cipants  manifest  themselves  as  differential  in-
creases of fMRI in the medial prefrontal cortex
with reference to self-judgment (Zhu et al. 2007;
Ray et al. 2010) and also to diverse brain re-
cordings  in  mind  reading  (Kobayashi et  al.
2007), holistic attention (Hedden et al. 2008), or
facial photo recognition (Na & Kitayama 2011).
The adult human brain thus builds up from a
complex  intertwining  of  cultural  circuits  pro-
gressively laid down during development within
the framework of a human-specific genetic en-
velope. 
There is no compelling evidence that cul-
turally-acquired phenotypes will sooner or later
be genetically transmitted. What the evidence
does show is that they have to be learned by
each generation,  by children from adults,  and
epigenetically  transmitted  from  generation  to
generation,  beginning  in  the  mother’s  womb
and up until  the adulthood. Teaching reading
and  writing  to  circa  five-year-old  children  re-
quires elaborate pedagogic strategies, which in a
general manner are absent in non-human prim-
ates (Premack 2007). 
In short, cultural imprints have a physical
reality in  the human brain.  Cultural  imprints
have  also  been  demonstrated  in  non-human
brains,  e.g.,  by Peter  Marler’s  work on birds’
song-learning (Marler 1970). Yet the importance
of cultural imprints on behaviour are comparat-
ively  much  more  important  in  humans  com-
pared to non-humans, in particular due to the
long postnatal period of brain maturation. They
play a critical role in shaping the brain pheno-
type in relation with the social group, through
oral and written language but also though di-
verse  culture-specific  habits,  traditions,  and
symbolic systems, including the ethical and so-
cial norms embodied in the adult brain.
I shall now proceed to discuss issues raised
by the combinatorial explosion of brain repres-
entations  and  the  channelling  of  behaviour
through  epigenetic rules and top-down control
of decision-making. 
epigenetic  rules  =Df In  neurobiological
terms, these “rules” shall be viewed as ac-
quired  patterns  of  connections  (scaffold-
ings), hypothetically stored in frontal cor-
tex  long-term  memory.  They  frame the
genesis of novel representations and regu-
late  decision-making  in  a top-down man-
ner.
4 “Epigenetic rules” and top-down 
control of decision-making
4.1 The hierarchical architecture of the 
brain
It  has  been  suggested  that  ethical  and social
norms  are,  from  a  perspective  in  which  the
brain  is  central,  ultimately  encoded  as  spati-
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otemporal  patterns  of  neuronal  activity  that
can be mobilized within the conscious neuronal
workspace  (Dehaene &  Changeux 2011).  Yet
from  a  neurobiological  standpoint,  this  view
hinges upon the classical issue of the combinat-
orial explosion raised by the immense network
of almost a million billion (1015) interconnected
synapses of the human brain. The question that
arises,  then, is  how the particular patterns of
neuronal  activity,  which,  for  instance,  encode
defined actions or  perceptual  events  and ulti-
mately ethical rules, are selected within this gi-
gantic neural network. In my view, the concept
of a hierarchical organisation of the brain needs
to be taken into consideration more closely. 
Analysis of the neurological deficits caused
by  lesions  discloses  hierarchical  and  parallel
neural  architectures  that  help  us  understand
higher  brain  functions  (Shallice &  Cooper
2011). Among these is  the inhibition of  auto-
matic (or reflex) actions and the elaboration of
goal-directed  behaviours  and  their  control.  In
the  brain,  an  evolutionary-recent  territory  of
cerebral  cortex  architecture,  the  lateral  pre-
frontal cortex, has been shown to play a critical
role  in  the  temporal  control  of  behaviour.  It
serves  as  a  “temporal  buffer”  between  past
events and future actions,  allowing behaviours
that follow internal goals to occur (Fuster 2001;
Goldman-Rakic 1987; Petrides 2005). Moreover,
the  lateral  prefrontal  cortex  exerts  top-down
control  of  cognitive  processes  associated  with
hierarchically-lower regions distributed in more
posterior  territories  on  the  basis  of  internal
plans,  goals,  or  what  may  be  referred  to  as
“rules”  (Miller &  Cohen 2001;  Passingham
1993; Shallice 1988; Dehaene & Changeux 1991;
Koechlin et al. 2003). It thus contributes to de-
cision-making  within  the  actual  context  of  a
given  individual  history  and  stored  memories
(Damasio 1994) and to “neurally encoded rules”
that can associate a context with a specific be-
havioural response and the ability to generalize
a rule in novel circumstances. 
An early formal model of learning by se-
lection according to a rule was devised in the
Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Task,  which  is  com-
monly used as a test of the integrity of frontal
lobe functions (Dehaene & Changeux 1991). It
requires subjects to infer a “rule” according to
which a deck of cards must be sorted, i.e., col-
our, shape, or number. Feedback from the ex-
perimenter takes the form of a simple positive
or negative reward (correct or incorrect).  The
goal for the subject is to get as many “right” re-
sponses as possible. Initially, cards must be sor-
ted according to, say, colour. When performance
is successful, the “sorting rule” is changed, for
example from colour to shape; the subject must
notice the change and find the new rule. The
global architecture of a network that passes the
task comprises two distinct levels of organiza-
tion: a low level (level 1) that governs the ori-
entation of the organism toward an object with
a defined feature and which would correspond
to  a  visuo-motor  loop,  including  visual  areas
and the premotor cortex; and a high level (level
2) that controls the behavioural task according
to a memory rule, and which would be homo-
logous to the prefrontal cortex or closely-related
areas  (Dehaene et  al. 1987;  Dehaene &
Changeux 1989).
A key feature of the model is that the high
level contains a particular category or cluster of
neurons,  referred  to  as  “rule-coding  clusters”,
each  of  which  codes  a  single  dimension  (e.g.,
number, colour, or shape). During the acquisi-
tion step, the layer of rule-coding neurons is as-
sumed to play the role of a “generator of di-
versity”. The spontaneous activity then plays a
critical role in the activation of a given rule-cod-
ing  cluster;  and  because  of  lateral  inhibition
only one cluster is active at a time. A search by
trial and error takes place, until a positive re-
ward is received from the environment (here the
experimenter). Then, the particular cluster act-
ive at this precise moment is selected (for dis-
cussion see  Monchi et al. 2001;  Asplund et al.
2010; Fuster 2008). The number of trials neces-
sary to learn the current rule is small (1–2), and
single trial learning may occur in normal sub-
jects  as  it  does  with  the  model  (Dehaene &
Changeux 1991).  This  learning  of  short-term
rules  based  upon  the  fast  (millisecond  to
second) allosteric transitions of synaptic recept-
ors may also be transferred to long-term stores
as  epigenetically-acquired  patterns  of  connec-
tions (see above). 
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In the course of the modelling of the Wis-
consin card-sorting task, an additional architec-
ture was introduced in the form of an auto-eval-
uation loop, which can short-circuit the reward
input from the exterior. It allows for an internal
evaluation  of  covert  motor  intentions  without
actualizing them as behaviours, but instead by
testing  them  by  comparison  with  memorized
former  experiences  (Dehaene &  Changeux
1991). 
In these early formulations, the “rule-cod-
ing clusters” were pre-wired in the neuronal net-
work. Subsequent models, however, opened the
range  of  possible  epigenetic  rules  to  a  brain-
wide  space  of  combinations  made  available
within  the  global  neuronal  workspace  (Baars
1988). This is of importance when we consider
the ability to coordinate thoughts or actions in
relation to internal goals, which is referred to as
“cognitive  control”  and is  a  rather  infrequent
phenomenon.  This  discussion  thus  illustrates
how rules encoding ethical norms may originate
from the brain. Against this background—which
shows how ethical rules might be epigenetically
built  from  brain  organization—I  propose  the
possibility of being epigenetically proactive, and
adapting  our  social  structures,  in  both  the
short- and long-term, to benefit, influence, and
constructively interact with the ever-developing
neuronal architecture of our brains.
4.2 A cascade model of top-down 
cognitive control 
Cognitive control has been further investigated
by  Koechlin et al. (2003) using a set of more
complex tasks than the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Task,  and which  span (at  least  three)  nested
levels  of  complexity.  They  consist  in  the
presentation of series’ of coloured visual stimuli
(squares or letters) organized into blocks, with
an increasing importance of contextual signals:
from “sensory control” with little if any contex-
tual signal, to “contextual control” and, at the
higher  level,  to  “episodic  control”.  Brain  ima-
ging fMRI recordings with healthy human sub-
jects revealed that the lateral prefrontal cortex
contributes to a hierarchical cascade of execut-
ive processes that involve at least three nested
levels of processing. These are neurally imple-
mented in distinct regions, from posterior pre-
motor to rostral lateral prefrontal cortex regions
(typically  Brodman’s  area  46;  Koechlin et  al.
2003;  Badre &  D’Esposito 2007;  Badre et  al.
2009). Patients with focal lateral prefrontal cor-
tex lesions performed cognitive tasks with sens-
ory, contextual, and episodic deficits associated
with focal  damage to Brodman’s  areas  6,  45,
and 46,  respectively—as is  expected from the
cascade  model  (Azuar et  al. 2014;  Kayser &
D’Esposito 2013). 
By analogy with the Wisconsin Card Sort-
ing Task (WCST) model mentioned above, be-
havioural rules are also sorted, but at different
nested  levels  of  information  processing,  the
highest level rules “controlling” in a top-down
manner  the  underlying  rules  closer  to  the
senses.  Hypothetically,  ethical  norms  may  be
viewed  as  some  particular  kind  of  “control
rules” developed within a social context, though
this possibility still deserves to be explored by
Koechlin, D’Esposito and colleagues. 
Recently  Collins &  Koechlin (2012) have
further suggested a computational model of hu-
man executive functioning associated with the
prefrontal cortex, which integrates multiple pro-
cesses during decision-making, such as expected-
ness  of  uncertainty,  task  switching,  and  rein-
forcement learning. The model reveals that the
human  frontal  function  may  monitor  up  to
three or four concurrent behavioural strategies
and infers online their ability to predict action
outcomes: whenever one appears more reliable
than unreliable, this strategy is chosen to guide
the selection and learning of actions that max-
imize rewards (see also  Miller &  Cohen 2001;
Passingham 1993;  Shallice 1988;  Fuster 2008;
Dehaene & Changeux 2011).
In their original paper, Collins and Koech-
lin do not explicitly mention social interaction.
Yet  we  may  consider  an  extension  of  their
model to the social  context by assuming that
ethical or social norms are part of the “concur-
rent behavioural strategies” that they postulate
exist  in  decision-making.  The  selection  and
learning of actions would then be more elabor-
ate than the simple maximization of immediate
rewards. 
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The developing baby is exposed very early
on to a defined social and cultural environment,
possibly  even  pre-natally  (Lagercrantz &
Changeux 2009;  Lagercrantz et  al. 2010).  At
this stage of  development an intense synapto-
genesis  steadily  occurs  in  the cerebral  cortex,
and  epigenetic  selection  of  neuronal  networks
accompanies the acquisition of the “maternal”
language as well as of the common rules of the
social community to which the child’s family be-
longs.  The  developing  baby/child  is  “impreg-
nated” with the current ethical rules of the so-
cial  community,  and this  is  often linked with
the symbolic (philosophical/religious) system of
representation  character  of  the  community  to
which it belongs. These early traces may last for
the lifetime of the individual and sooner or later
create  conflicting  relationships  with  a  fast-
evolving  environment  aggravated  by  the  in-
creased longevity of  the individual  (Changeux
1985). On the basis of the neurobiological data
mentioned above, one may define these rules as
epigenetically-acquired  patterns  of  connections
(scaffoldings) stored in frontal cortex long-term
memory, which frame the genesis of novel rep-
resentation  and  “cognitively  controlled”  de-
cision-making in a top-down manner. 
Against  this  background  I  propose  the
possibility of being epigenetically proactive and
adapting  our  social  structures,  in  both  the
short- and the long-term, to benefit, influence,
and constructively interact with the ever-devel-
oping neuronal architecture of our brains.
5 A naturalistic responsibility
5.1 Proactive epigenesis
The first sentence in the 1948 Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights states: “All human be-
ings  are  born  free  and  equal  in  dignity  and
rights.”
Read as a description of the actual situ-
ation of human beings, this is blatantly and tra-
gically false. Read as a normative ideal that we
should strive for, it is noble but tragically un-
realistic: considering our present cerebral struc-
ture, we are not likely to acknowledge in actual
social practice the equal dignity and rights of all
individuals independently of race, gender, creed,
etc.  Life  conditions  may  have  improved  for
many humans over time, yet the present global
situation  remains  appalling,  notably,  with  re-
spect to poverty, unequal distribution of health
care, and the predominantly non-egalitarian or
bellicose  relations  between  individuals  or
groups. The vast majority of human beings ap-
pear reluctant, unable to identify with, or show
compassion towards those who are beyond (and
sometimes even towards those who are within)
their sphere. While some societies or individuals
may be more prone than others to developing a
strong ethnic identity, violence, racism, sexism,
social hierarchies, or exclusion, all exhibit some
form and measure of xenophobia.
What I  have here suggested,  however,  is
that we might make presently unrealistic ideals,
such as equality in dignity and rights, somewhat
more realistic by selecting them for epigenetic
proactivity. 
Synaptic  epigenetic  theories  of  cultural
and social imprinting on our brain architecture
open the door to being epigenetically proactive,
which means that we may culturally influence
our brain organisation with the aim of self-im-
provement, individually as well as socially, and
change our biological predispositions through a
better  fit  of  our  brain  to  cultures  and  social
structures. 
I suggest that certain areas of research are
especially important to pursue with the goal of
“epigenetic proaction” in mind. They aim at in-
tegrating recent advances in neuroscientific re-
search into normative debates at the level of so-
ciety. This does not necessarily mean that my
level  of  explanation  is  “neurocentric”  or
“neuroreductionist”.  My aim is more “encyclo-
pedic” in the sense that I wish to illustrate the
benefits that neuroscience can bring to the hu-
manities and social sciences and conversely. I do
not see myself as either neuro-“centric” or “re-
ductionist”—which would mean an exclusion of
other categories of determinants at the social or
historical levels—but I am more modestly will-
ing to unify knowledge between the humanities
and the neurosciences, which are too often de-
liberately omitted from the debate. This can be
illustrated by two examples: violence in adoles-
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cents  in  relation  to their  social  environments,
and violence in adults associated with intercon-
fessional conflicts. 
Violence in adolescents is a common phe-
nomenon in  our  societies  and it  is  frequently
repressed through police  and judiciary means,
often  resulting  in  incarceration.  But  this  ap-
proach to juvenile violence simply omits the sci-
entifically-established  fact  that  adolescence  is
also  a  time  of  “neurodevelopmental  crisis”.
Evidence  from anatomical  and functional-ima-
ging studies has highlighted major modifications
of cortical circuits during adolescence. These in-
clude reductions of gyrification and grey matter,
increases  in the myelination of  cortico-cortical
connections, and changes in the architecture of
large-scale cortical networks—including precent-
ral,  temporal,  and frontal  areas.  (Klein et  al.
2014).  Uhlhaas et  al. (2009)  have  used  MEG
synchrony as  an  indicator  of  conscious  access
and  cognitive  performance  (rev.  Dehaene &
Changeux 2011). Until early adolescence, devel-
opmental  improvements  in  cognitive  perform-
ance  are  accompanied  by  increases  in  neural
MEG synchrony.  This  developmental  phase  is
followed by an unexpected  decrease  in  neural
synchrony that occurs  during late adolescence
and  is  associated  with  reduced  performance.
After this period of destabilization follows a re-
organization of synchronization patterns that is
accompanied  by  pronounced  increases  in
gamma-band  power  and  in  theta  and  beta
phase synchrony (Uhlhaas et  al. 2009).  These
remarkable changes in neural connectivity and
performance in the adolescent are only just be-
ing explored and may lead to special unexpec-
ted proactive care from society. In turn, this re-
quires active research, including a social educat-
ive environment adequate to adolescents’ special
needs. This may include adequate physical exer-
cise,  cultural  games,  educational  training,  and
new kinds of therapies yet to be invented.
Violent  interconfessional  conflicts  have
raged throughout human history. They continue
to  plague  our  modern  societies  and  are
presently an important cause of wars and other
forms  of  violence  throughout  the  world.  One
should remember that every newborn and child
brain incorporates critical features of its biolo-
gical,  social,  and cultural  environment includ-
ing, in addition to spoken and written language,
symbolic  systems  and  religious  rituals  (which
include  dietary  and  vestimentary  practices  as
markers  of  the faith).  These  epigenetic  traces
are almost irreversibly laid down and may per-
sist throughout the whole life of the individual.
Yet they might be renewed through epigenetic
transmission from adults to newborns. In this
context,  early  proactive  epigenetic  imprinting
through education is of critical importance. The
aim of that education should not be to abolish
faith  or  emotional  convictions  (e.g.,  moral,
political,  or religious) but only to control the
fervour, intolerance, and fanaticism in their ex-
pression. The problem, as I see it, is not a belief
itself,  but the emotional intensity to which it
gives  rise  and the  manner  in  which  it  is  ex-
pressed. Influencing a child brain to reduce its
propensity to ideological violence or fanaticism
and enhance its tolerance to others’ differences
also requires special proactive care from society
that per force involves active research—includ-
ing a social educative environment adequate to
this particular goal.
These  are  only  two  illustrations  of  the
many  that  are  possible,  chosen  because  they
have been problematic throughout the history
of humankind and show no signs of disappear-
ing.
At the individual level,  the social  condi-
tions of an infant, or an adolescent, are of cru-
cial  importance in their  cerebral  development,
and  adequate  conditions  can  in  principle  be
provided. The factual realism of this application
is largely a matter of political  will  and social
agreement.  The  scientific  challenge  will  be  to
further develop the knowledge of  these condi-
tions and their effects on the developing infant
and adolescent brain. Also, the challenge will be
to develop our knowledge of how social condi-
tions  affect  the  adult  brain,  e.g.,  to  prevent
neurodegeneration.
On a more general level, when applied on
a larger scale to a society, a population, or to
the entire human species, the argument follows
the same logic and is no less important—but it
becomes considerably more complicated to ap-
ply, theoretically as well as practically.
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If  new cultural  imprints  were epigenetic-
ally stored in our brains (say, less violent or less
sectarian  features),  future  generations  would
presumably develop societies that reflect them
(i.e.,  become more  peaceful  and inclusive).  A
weakness of this optimistic reasoning is its cir-
cularity,  since  we  would  already  need  to  be
peaceful in  order for a peaceful society to be
maintained.  A crucial  question  then becomes:
how long does it take for a cultural character-
istic to leave a cerebral trace? In some measure
stable  and  enduring  cultural  structures  are
needed in order to effect stable neurobiological
changes and store cultural imprints in the brain
that might give evolution a push in the right
direction, but the chances of maintaining societ-
ies that conflict with the present nature of its
inhabitants—say, maintaining a peaceful egalit-
arian rule in a society of violent xenophobes—
are arguably slim.
The  challenges  involved  in  trying  to  be
epigenetically proactive by culturally influencing
the future actions of human genes and neuronal
structures, with the aim of altering higher cog-
nitive  functions  and  their  resulting  behaviour
seem formidable, at least if enlarged sympathy
is  on  the  agenda.  Still,  within  the  epigenetic
neuroscientific framework, at least the theoret-
ical possibility exists, and it is worthy of consid-
eration by many other disciplines beyond neur-
oscience. Depending on how we choose to de-
velop our culture, one day epigenetic rules that
enlarge  the  presently-narrow  realm  of  human
sympathy might perhaps emerge.
5.2 Conclusion: A naturalistic 
responsibility
The  origins  of  norms  and  the  relationship
between facts and values have been much de-
bated in philosophy. Reasoning that weds sci-
entific theory with normative considerations has
been accused of committing the logical error of
confusing facts and values, which is known as
“the naturalistic fallacy”.
The  expression  “the  naturalistic  fallacy”
was coined by the British moral philosopher G.
E. Moore and refers in his work to the identific-
ation  (or  reduction)  of  goodness  with  (or  to)
another  property  such  as  utility,  pleasure,  or
happiness (Moore 1903). That issue is not relev-
ant in the present context. In the interpretation
of the naturalistic fallacy that is relevant here,
the fallacy consists in deriving an “ought” from
an “is”, or a value from a fact, and letting de-
scriptive properties entail normative properties,
which  confuses  the  distinction  between  facts
and values in  a fallacious manner.  This  argu-
ment is reminiscent of David Hume’s claim that
what is is entirely different from what ought to
be, for “the distinction of vice and virtue is not
founded on the relations of objects, nor is per-
ceiv’d by reason” but is fundamentally a matter
of feelings and as such is neither true nor false
(Hume 1739, III, I). I agree that it is fallacious
to derive “ought to be” from “is”, and consider
this  a  conceptual  mistake  that  our  theory  of
epigenetic  proaction  must  and  indeed  does
avoid. I do not assert that factual descriptions
of  the  brain’s  architecture  are  tantamount  to
yielding  recommendations  or  assertions  of
norms, do not confuse “is” with “ought”, and
consequently do not commit the naturalistic fal-
lacy in this formulation.
We should observe  that  a  value may be
represented  on  many  levels:  non-conscious  as
well as conscious, as a basic biological function
or  as  a  feature  of  advanced  moral  reasoning.
When discussing the naturalistic fallacy, value
as a feature of advanced normative reasoning is
the relevant sense of the term. The logical dis-
tinction between fact and value could collapse if
the  term is  defined  differently—say,  if  it  fea-
tures  as  a  non-normative  biological  function.
The logical error in the naturalistic fallacy con-
cerns the fact/value distinction as it is drawn
between normative and descriptive statements,
namely between ought and is; not between facts
that are/are not biological  values,  where that
concern would presumably not arise. 
However,  eagerness  to avoid the natural-
istic  fallacy  must  not  prevent  our  normative
reasoning from being informed by scientific the-
ories. Normative judgments should be informed
by facts, even though they cannot be entailed
by them. If certain evaluative tendencies are in-
nate in the normal human brain’s architecture,
such as self-interest and selective sympathy, this
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fact (if it is one) about the human being’s neur-
onal  structure  would  admittedly  entail  that
every healthy, sufficiently mature individual will
to some degree feel both self-interest and sym-
pathy  towards  some  other  creature.  However,
this is not the entailment of a norm, but an em-
pirical entailment of another fact.  It does not
entail that it is good (or bad), or that we ought
to conceive it as good (or bad) that we are thus
construed. Similarly, if it is true that we are, for
example, and as we have argued, self-projective
xenophobes, knowledge of this (presumed) fact
is not in itself a justification of it. Understand-
ing is not the same as justification: to know, or
to understand, is not to approve. On the con-
trary,  knowledge  about  our  neural  structures’
predispositions should increase our awareness of
the need for stable and realistic social structures
and agreements to keep us in check.
We should also observe that a belief in the
approximate  universality  of  certain  values,  or
preferential tendencies as innate features of the
human  neurobiological  make-up,  is  logically
compatible with a belief in maintaining the de-
scription/norm distinction.
My primary focus has been on the import-
ant  empirical  connections  between  biological
facts  and  norms.  Norms  are  brain  constructs
elaborated  by  human societies,  biologically  as
well as culturally embedded in and constrained
by  the  contingent  evolution  of  socio-cultural
structures—in particular, by the multiple sym-
bolic  philosophical  and  religious  systems  that
have developed. This  fact,  and the realisation
that  normative judgments should be informed
by facts even though they cannot be entailed by
them suggests  that  science,  philosophy  and—
not least—neuroethics—have a major responsib-
ility: namely to decipher the network of causal
connections between the neurobiological, socio-
cultural, and contingent historical perspectives
that allow a moral norm to be enunciated at a
given moment in human history; and to evalu-
ate their “universal” character as pre-specified
in our genome and shared by the human species
in distinction from those relative to a given cul-
ture or symbolic system. The “fallacy” of  the
naturalistic  approach  is  thus  inverted  into  a
naturalistic responsibility (Evers 2009): the re-
sponsibility to connect facts and values, biology,
and socio-cultural  structures,  and to use  that
enriched  understanding  for  the  benefit  of
ourselves and our societies.
We may hope that  through the  rational
exchange  of  arguments  between partners  with
different cultures and moral traditions debating
together, a species-specific “human core” could
become dominant beyond individual differences
and  converge  on  a  common  structure
(Changeux & Ricoeur 2000). At the same time,
we must note that the diversity of human indi-
viduals and societies is enormous and must be
respected while we strive to find this common
ground that might allow coexistence.
The idea of proactively selecting those spe-
cific  dispositions  or  capacities  (such  as  sym-
pathy) that we all share as human beings which
that,  if  properly  developed,  may  benefit  our
global  co-existence  while  respecting  individual
and ideological diversities,  is  well in line with
Darwin. Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man: 
As man advances in civilization, and small
tribes are united into larger communities,
the simplest reason would tell  each indi-
vidual that he ought to extend his social
instincts and sympathies to all members of
the  same  nation,  though  personally  un-
known  to  him.  This  point  being  once
reached, there is only an artificial barrier
to prevent his sympathies extending to the
men of all nations and races.
Lewontin (1993)  argues  that  while  traditional
Darwinism  has  portrayed  the  organism  as  a
passive recipient of environmental influences, a
correct  understanding  should  emphasize  that
humans are active constructors of their own en-
vironment—in particular the social and cultural
environment. I agree and argue further that, in
line with Darwin, we can be active constructors
of our own brains through using our environ-
ment and culture, in a relationship that is recip-
rocal.
In this article, my main focus has been on
feasibility—that is, on whether we  can be epi-
genetically proactive. If we assume an affirmat-
ive answer to that question, an important fol-
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low-up question arises: whether we should be so.
My basic position, that I have here tried to ex-
press,  is  that  epigenetic  proaction could be  a
very promising, powerful, and long-term way of
influencing human nature and of improving our
societies. However, in order to pursue this in a
responsible and adequate manner, caution is re-
quired, along with careful analyses of the relev-
ant  social  and  ethical  issues.  Science  can  be,
and  has  throughout  history  repeatedly  been,
ideologically hijacked, and the resulting dangers
increase  with  the  strength  of  the  science  in
question. If, say, humans learn to design their
own brain more potently than we already do by
selecting what we believe to be brain-nourishing
food and pursuing neuronally-healthy life-styles,
we could use that knowledge well—that is, there
is certainly room for improvement. On the other
hand, the dream of the perfect human being has
a sordid past, providing ample cause for concern
about such projects. Historic awareness is of the
utmost importance for neuroethics when assess-
ing suggested applications in a responsible and
adequate manner. Moreover, what we mean by
“responsible and adequate” is open to interpret-
ation. The traits we choose to favour epigenetic-
ally, and the social structures we choose to de-
velop, depend on who “we” are, and in what so-
ciety we wish to live.
Arthur Koestler compares evolution to “a
labyrinth  of  blind  alleys”  and  suggests  that
“there is nothing very strange or improbable in
the  assumption  that  man’s  native  equipment,
though superior to that of any other living spe-
cies, nevertheless contains some built-in error or
deficiency which predisposes him to self-destruc-
tion” (Koestler 1967, xi). In that light, steering
evolution by influencing the cultural imprints to
be stored in our brains appears  to be an at-
tractive option.
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